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DIRECTORATE OF  
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# Intelligence Memorandum

*Rumania's National Communist Course*

**Confidential**

20 November 1967  
No. 1397/67

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
20 November 1967

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Rumania's National Communist Course

Summary

During the past two years, Rumania's militant policies of independence of both the Communist and non-Communist worlds have been accentuated by the regime's nationalistic Communist leaders. Under the "second generation" Communist leadership of Nicolae Ceausescu, the regime has repeatedly shown its determination to ignore Communist solidarity in pursuit of its national objectives. Bucharest's insistence upon freedom of action in foreign affairs and equality of Communist parties in fact as well as in theory has frequently clashed with the policy line adopted by Moscow and its allies.

The Rumanians have sought exposure to the West in search of political, economic, and technological benefits. Bucharest has recognized West Germany, remained neutral in the Arab-Israeli crisis, and has maintained a steady stream of visitors to the West, particularly to the US.

Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of Economic Research and with the Office of National Estimates.

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Having achieved its major foreign policy goals, the regime probably will avoid further undertakings that would risk possible Russian overreaction. However, as the limits of permissible divergence are extended by practice, the Rumanians can be expected to define in even more independent terms their relationship to the Communist and non-Communist worlds.

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National Self-Interest

"Generally speaking, only life is the supreme judge, and only practical results can confirm the correctness of a political line or position."

Party ideologue  
Paul Niculescu-Mizil  
24 July 1967

1. The success of Rumania's nationalist policies in recent years demonstrates that a small state can exercise considerable leverage in asserting its particular interests against the broader, more generalized interests of a great power. Nearly four years ago, in April 1964, the Rumanian regime published its "declaration of independence" against the backdrop of the Sino-Soviet dispute. The Rumanian leaders have since exploited at every opportunity this and other Russian political difficulties to achieve their own ends, showing in the process that it is not necessary to dance to the Soviet tune. The obverse of Bucharest's policies and actions toward the USSR is seen in its receptivity to the "bridge-building" policies of the Western powers. As Rumania has increased its economic and political contacts with Western Europe, it has acquired additional maneuverability for its efforts to disengage from Moscow. Gradually, by providing Bucharest with an alternative to dependence on the USSR, these contacts have become one of the mainstays of Bucharest's independent policy.

"Life demonstrates that a people that is deprived of a part of its national prerogatives ceases being free and sovereign, a fact that jeopardizes its very social development. Disregard of this

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reality conflicts with the aspirations of the peoples, with the objective laws of social development, produces the powerful reaction of the population, and rouses the entire nation to fight."

Party Chief Ceausescu  
24 July 1967

2. The driving force in the recent evolution of Rumanian policy, both foreign and domestic, has been nationalism. The leadership has drawn heavily upon Rumania's traditionally strident brand of this complex of beliefs and myths, and has portrayed itself as the defender and logical continuer of all that is "best" in that tradition. Ceausescu often resurrects passages from speeches given many years ago at the League of Nations by Rumania's outstanding foreign minister after World War I, Nicolea Titulescu, to create a sense of historical continuity. In these references to the past, Ceausescu particularly emphasizes the role of the nation-state and the importance of national sovereignty. By such devices, Ceausescu associates his regime with those Rumanian pre-Communist experiences that were and continue to be popular with the party and the people. The people's Latin heritage, the importance of the nation-state, and the role of small versus large nations in world affairs are three themes that have parallels in both the pre-Communist and the Ceausescu periods.

3. Unlike most other Communist regimes, the Ceausescu regime professes to see no contradiction between these nationalistic themes and those of proletarian internationalism. Indeed, Ceausescu argues that every country building socialism is contributing to socialist and proletarian internationalism. Rumania's independent initiatives, therefore, are ideologically "correct."

#### The Ceausescu Leadership

4. Ceausescu became party chief in March 1965 upon the death of Gheorghiu-Dej. He was Dej's choice,

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and he took over the reins of the party and state at a most propitious time. Dej had set Rumania firmly on the path to greater economic and political autonomy, plans already had been made for the ninth party congress, revised party statutes were being drafted, and a new national constitution was awaiting approval. Thus, Ceausescu had an opportunity to put his personal stamp on the party's and on the nation's future economic and political policies.

5. Ceausescu's efforts have been dramatic in the sphere of foreign policy, but he has also placed many of his supporters in key posts in the leadership of the country. The Rumanian party is now under the command of "second generation" Communists to an extent exceeding all others in Eastern Europe. These leaders are for the most part small townsmen ever conscious of their national heritage. The descendants of peasants, they retain the strong nationalism of the peasantry.

6. The Ceausescu team is thus much more nationalistic in outlook than leaders from the older generation, such as Emil Bodnaras, Chivu Stoica, and Gheorghe Apostol. These men, along with Ceausescu and Premier Maurer, formed the power elite that initially ruled after Dej's death, but they have since been pushed out of the picture by Ceausescu. The "second generation" leadership escaped the strict discipline imposed on Dej's generation by the Soviet-led Comintern, and does not owe its accession to power directly to the Soviet Union as did that of Dej, which assumed power when the country was occupied by Soviet forces.

#### Party Unity

7. Long one of the most homogenous parties in Eastern Europe, the Rumanian party has maintained a high degree of unity since 1957. It has done this despite the shunting aside of the older leaders by Ceausescu and apparent recent Soviet efforts to subvert the leadership. Last May, Ceausescu sharply, if indirectly, criticized the Soviets for "contacts

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## CENTRAL COMMITTEE of the RUMANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

### Key Personalities



CEAUSESCU, Nicolae



MAURER, Ion Gheorghe



NICULESCU-MIZIL, Paul



VERDET, Ilie

### PERMANENT PRESIDIU

CEAUSESCU, Nicolae  
MAURER, Ion Gheorghe  
NICULESCU-MIZIL, Paul  
VERDET, Ilie  
STOICA, Chivu  
BIRLADEANU, Alexandru  
BODNARAS, Emil  
APOSTOL, Gheorghe  
DRAGHICI, Alexandru

### SECRETARIAT

General Secretary: CEAUSESCU, Nicolae

Secretaries :  
DALEA, Mihai  
DRAGHICI, Alexandru  
GERE, Mihai  
MANESCU, Manea  
MOGHIOROS, Alexandru  
NICULESCU-MIZIL, Paul  
PATILINET, Vasile  
RAUTU, Leonte  
TROFIN, Virgil

### EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Full Members:

APOSTOL, Gheorghe	MAURER, Ion Gheorghe
BERGHIANU, Maxim	MOGHIOROS, Alexandru
BIRLADEANU, Alexandru	NICULESCU-MIZIL, Paul
BODNARAS, Emil	RADULESCU, Gheorghe
BORILA, Petre	RAUTU, Leonte
CEAUSECU, Nicolae	STOICA, Chivu
DRAGAN, Constantin	VERDET, Ilie
DRAGHICI, Alexandru	VOITEC, Stefan

Alternate Members:

BANC, Iosif	GERE, Mihai
BLAJOVICI, Petre	LUPU, Petre
COLIU, Dumitru	MANESCU, Manea
DANALACHE, Florian	POPA, Dumitru
FAZEKAS, Janos	VILCU, Vasile



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outside the organized framework" and warned that "under such circumstances, each party is fully entitled to take every measure it considers necessary so as to ensure its political and organizational unity, the implementation of its political line." The Rumanian parliament's session last July--the first time all members of the party's elite body, the Permanent Presidium, have delivered speeches on the same occasion since July 1965--illustrated this unity as well as the pre-eminence of Ceausescu's appointees vis-a-vis the "old guard."

8. Ceausescu's appointees generally are men of his own generation, outlook, and inclination. This appears particularly true in his appointments to top positions in economic or technical areas of responsibility. Ceausescu favors the development of the technocratic and specialist classes. The party's pre-eminence in directing the administration of technology, scientific research, and the economy is, however, unquestioned. Ceausescu's principal lieutenants will perform a similar role under a proposed economic reform, and a regional territorial reorganization. However, any such far-reaching proposals are bound to, and indeed probably already have, caused disagreements within the leadership and uncertainty among local officials.

9. Of the numerous supporters Ceausescu has promoted, Ilie Verdet and Paul Niculescu-Mizil appear especially favored, and both now are Presidium members. They presumably were placed in that body to counter the weight of the veterans who had risen with Gheorghiu-Dej. Both clearly carry more influence with Ceausescu than any member of the "old guard" except Premier Maurer.

10. Maurer ranks second only to Ceausescu in the hierarchy at this time. He seems to have the complete confidence of the party chief as the regime's leading foreign policy advocate. At the recent parliamentary session, for example, Ceausescu praised Maurer for his meetings with Presidents Johnson and De Gaulle, although he omitted any reference to Maurer's recent "secret" talks with Chinese

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Premier Chou En-lai. The premier's honored position as last to speak at the parliamentary meeting, and the party's recent resolution praising Maurer's contribution to Rumania, further attest to his high standing.

Foreign Policy

"Certainly, the causes which have led to the present state of affairs are deep and particularly complex. There is no doubt, however, that a major factor in their constant deterioration is that the old practice of interference in the internal affairs of other parties of other socialist states, the tendencies to impose points of view from the outside, name-calling, and resorting to accusations and condemnations have not been abandoned."

Scinteia editorial  
28 February 1967

11. With increasing frequency, Ceauesescu's foreign policies have clashed with those of Moscow and its allies. Since early this year, the regime has been particularly insistent upon its freedom of action in foreign affairs and has pressed ahead with at least equal vigor in formulating a "new type" of interparty relations.

12. The regime's "declaration of independence" in April 1964 has become the cornerstone of its policies. This declaration states that the "principles" of "national independence and sovereignty, equal rights, mutual advantage, comradely assistance, non-interference in internal affairs, observance of territorial integrity, socialist internationalism... form the immutable law...of the entire world socialist system" and the "only basis of unity."

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13. The pragmatic application of these principles has become a hallmark of the Ceausescu regime, but this pragmatism has been accompanied by emphatic reiterations of the regime's close adherence to Marxist-Leninist doctrine. In so justifying its actions, Bucharest has made it difficult for its allies to take it publicly to task for emphasizing its own national interests to the detriment of unity in the Communist camp.

14. In interparty relations, Bucharest has stressed that all national parties are coequal and therefore can not be subjected arbitrarily to general policy lines. Although this doctrine has been endorsed by all Eastern European capitals and by Moscow--it was embodied in the declarations of the 1957 and 1960 conferences of Communist parties--the Rumanians evidently doubt whether their allies, and especially Moscow, mean what they say. Recent articles in the Rumanian press have contained thinly veiled references to Soviet attempts to influence Ceausescu's party leadership, and attest to Bucharest's mistrust concerning party relations with Moscow.

15. In evidencing a desire for detente on terms more acceptable to the West than to Moscow, the regime has sought to demonstrate that it is not tied to a reliance on Communist solidarity to the extent that its allies are for ensuring its own survival. It welcomes exposure to Western ideas in order to gain the political, technological, and scientific benefits of expanded relations with the industrially advanced countries of the non-Communist world.

#### Relations With the Communist World

"Unnatural is the fact that methods and practices in contradiction with the standards of equal rights and noninterference in internal affairs, standards deriving from the very nature of socialist internationalism, should occur in relationships between socialist countries."

Premier Maurer, 25 July 1967

16. The Rumanian regime's independent foreign policy has won Bucharest grudging admirers but few friends among its European allies. Its relations with Moscow have suffered as Soviet-Rumanian party-state interests have coincided less and less, and the leadership seems to have concluded that this trend will continue in the future. Elsewhere, the regime has impaired its relations with Poland and East Germany by its recognition of Bonn and its obvious desire to expand this relationship. East Germany and Czechoslovakia, the other advanced industrial states in the region, are also annoyed by Rumania's increasing efforts to find capital equipment and machinery in the West. Its relations with Hungary are vexed by the issue of the Translyvanian irredenta. Only with Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, its Balkan neighbors, does Bucharest have good relations. Its relations with Albania vary from correct to cordial, depending on atmospherics in the Communist world.

17. In being "reasnably unreasonable" with the Soviet Union, Bucharest has chosen to differ primarily about those issues which offer hope of a resolution favorable to its national interests. The regime has demonstrated this tactic by characterizing as anachronisms both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, by establishing diplomatic relations with West Gemany, by remaining neutral in the Arab-Israeli war, and by boycotting the all-European Communist parties' conference at Karlovy Vary last April. Each of these policy moves proceeded from a realistic evaluation of its potential for success, and each was clearly motivated by national rather than bloc interests.

18. The Warsaw Pact, in theory a mutual defense organization, increasingly has become a device for political consultation, largely because of Rumanian insistence. Rumanian dissatisfaction with the pact reached a peak early in the summer of 1966 over the issue of Moscow's desire to integrate the various national armies more closely within the pact structure. Bucharest's resistance to this idea

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apparently helped thwart Moscow's plans. Bucharest has refrained from any open commentary on the issue since then, although it almost certainly also opposed the recent appointment of Soviet General Yakubovsky to command the pact.

19. Bucharest's recognition of Bonn last January also meant that the Rumanian "deviation" had breached the limits of acceptable behavior for members of the socialist family on the hypersensitive German question. While the Rumanians could and did argue that Moscow had had its ambassador in Bonn since 1955, this unilateral Rumanian action had such important ramifications for bloc unity that Moscow joined with the East Germans and Poles to delay recognition of Bonn by other East European regimes.

20. Bucharest introduced a new element of discord with its allies by adopting a self-serving "neutral" position on the Arab-Israeli war. Alone of the Eastern European countries, the Rumanian regime refused to sign the bloc statement on 9 June following the Moscow meeting which it attended, and would not break diplomatic relations with Israel.

21. A chronic irritant in Rumanian-Soviet relations periodically inflamed by Bucharest is the Rumanian irredenta of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, now, respectively, a part of Soviet Moldavia and the Ukraine. Bucharest continues to use the irredenta as devices with which to embarrass Moscow and to try to keep it off balance politically.

22. Bucharest and Moscow also appear to have differences over renewal of their bilateral mutual friendship and assistance treaty. Signed in February 1948 and slated to be renewed automatically for five years next February unless renegotiated, the treaty contains a mutual military assistance clause that Bucharest finds excessively restrictive. It appears probable that Bucharest will in time grudgingly renew this treaty in some form.

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"There is one correct, sure, principle-minded, and efficient way to discuss problems of common interest and to exchange views, including problems containing divergencies: This is the way of direct contact of party to party, of leadership to leadership."

Scinteia editorial  
28 February 1967

23. Despite these conflicts with its European allies, Bucharest continues to engage in frequent bilateral party and state exchanges with them and to give equal attention to Moscow and Peking. Bucharest's initial support of Moscow in the Sino-Soviet dispute has become progressively less evident as the regime has pursued its independent course.

24. Sino-Rumanian relations, for their part, have yet to recover fully from Premier Chou En-lai's attempt to use his visit to Rumania in June 1966 to attack the USSR. Both Peking and Bucharest appear to have exerted considerable effort to paper over their differences. The Rumanian press, for example, has yet to mention the Cultural Revolution, and Premier Maurer has visited China three times during the past year, once shortly after his meetings with Presidents Johnson and De Gaulle last summer.

25. Rumania's relations with North Korea and North Vietnam remain good. Bucharest continues to give only token military support to Hanoi and its handling of the war in its propaganda media is generally in low key. With Pyongyang, Bucharest has shown support for its efforts to enter the United Nations.

#### Interparty Relations

"Unity does not mean reduction to the same denominator...it does not mean uniformity."

Scinteia editorial  
28 February 1967

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26. In interparty relations, the Rumanians have repeatedly and publicly stressed the greater utility of bilateral contacts over multilateral ones, particularly since the first of this year. In defining the conditions necessary for its participation in multiparty meetings in an article in Scinteia late February, the regime observed that the Rumanian party requires "propitious conditions," which take into "consideration the particularities of the situation and of relations among parties, the existence of a climate of mutual trust, esteem, and respect conducive to cordately and principle-minded talks."

27. Aside from these conditions, the party also is deeply concerned over the potential of multiparty meetings for formalizing the intra-Communist split and for the assertion of Soviet hegemony over the Eastern European Communist states. It particularly objects to what it considers to be the Soviet practice of establishing a general party line through the use of majority rule. The Rumanian party believes instead that all multiparty meetings should from the outset agree to an "exchange of views," and accept as generally binding only those conclusions unanimously agreed to.

"Each Communist Party has the legitimate right to participate in an international meeting if it considers it necessary and useful, as it also has the legitimate right not to participate. Internationalist solidarity is not contingent upon participation or nonparticipation in a conference. It has a much more profound content, which is manifest in the identity of goals of the Communist parties..."

Party Chief Ceausescu  
in Scinteia  
7 May 1967

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28. It was within this frame of reference that Rumania boycotted the all-European Communist parties' meeting at Karlovy Vary last April. In objecting to the conference's "aim, character, and proceedings," the Rumanian party took a major step toward the Yugoslav position and away from its other allies. In doing so, Bucharest clearly gave precedence to its self-interest, stating that it would not attend a European security conference that would discuss the German question.

29. Rumania's decision to boycott the Karlovy Vary conference makes it questionable that it will participate in future multilateral meetings. The regime probably will assess each invitation carefully within the context of what it increasingly calls "new type" relations and "world realities." The Rumanians, thus, almost certainly intended their presence at the Soviet 50th anniversary celebrations as an illustration of the distinction they draw between participating in ceremonial interparty gatherings and formal ones.

#### Relations with the West

30. Rumania has sharply stepped-up its contacts with the West, particularly Western Europe. In addition to recognizing Bonn, the regime became the first in Eastern Europe to recognize the Greek military junta and the first to establish consular relations with Spain. It also has concluded consular agreements with Italy and France, and has markedly increased its exchanges with non-Communist "progressive" parties throughout Western Europe.

31. Rumanian-US relations have improved steadily during the past year even though the war in Vietnam continues to be an inhibiting factor, but one the regime generally has played down. Premier Maurer's meeting with President Johnson late last June was a high point in this development. Maurer is the first Eastern European premier to confer with a US President, and the regime widely publicized the event.



32. The regime also has very sharply increased the sending of scientists, technicians, and educators to the US. Late last January, for example, the regime decided to send 23 ranking economic and industrial officials to the US for lengthy study visits. It also has exhibited generally improved cooperation with US officials and has indicated an interest in resuming negotiations for a consular convention in the "not too distant future."

Rumania at the United Nations

"The concept according to which mankind's destiny lies solely in the hands of the big powers does no longer correspond to the new conditions of social development. Reality demonstrates that the settlement of international disputes can no longer be decided only by the big powers, as this depends nowadays on the active cooperation of all states of the world."

"By acting with vigor and militancy in defense of their legitimate interests and rights, the middle-sized and small countries can considerably influence the course of events..."

Party Chief Ceausescu  
24 July 1967

33. Bucharest's quest for enhanced international prestige has been assisted by the election of Rumanian Foreign Minister Manescu to the presidency of the current United Nations General Assembly last September. The first Communist government official to hold the office, Manescu began his acceptance speech by stressing that the confidence

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placed in him was "clearly addressed to his country" and emphasized the role of "small- and medium-sized nations" in international affairs. Although the president never votes in the assembly, the resourceful Manescu will be in a good position to initiate new proposals through the Rumanian delegation as well as possibly to influence events through his easy access to Secretary General Thant.



68536  
MANESCU, Corneliu  
RUMANIAN MINISTER of FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
and CURRENTLY PRESIDENT of UN GA

#### The Outlook

"It is a historic reality, an essential aspect of the entire social development that the nation far from having exhausted its possibilities, has an outstanding important role to play in the ascending progress of human society."

Leonte Rautu addressing  
the Rumanian parliament  
25 July 1967

34. Rumania has achieved the major foreign policy goals that it has pursued so avidly since the first of the year. Bucharest probably will now be more concerned with consolidating its advances in external affairs, during which period the regime's leaders will probably focus much more attention on domestic policies. There remains, moreover, no apparent innovation in foreign policy that Bucharest could contemplate undertaking with equanimity that would achieve benefits commensurate with the potential political risks of a possible Russian over-reaction.

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35. In the immediate future, therefore, Bucharest will probably await new opportunities to assert further significant independence within the Communist world. Such opportunities may arise in connection with its promotion of the Group of Nine--an informal association of small European states seeking detente and cooperation in Europe--or as the time for re-evaluation of the Warsaw Pact and its relations to NATO (1969) approaches. In the meantime, the regime will continue gradually to strengthen its relations with the West and attempt to play a leading role in promoting European detente, possibly through the United Nations.

36. Rumania, along with Yugoslavia, is a leading exponent of pragmatic Communism in Eastern Europe. As East-West contacts expand and ideological and political diversity become more pronounced, however, other Communist regimes in Eastern Europe can be expected selectively to adapt to their conditions the policies developed by the two Balkan innovators. Gradually, what is now considered revisionist and nonconformist will become the accepted norm. Thus, in time, the stage will be set for Bucharest to exert itself once again to establish new and broader policies redefining in even more independent terms its relationship to the Communist and non-Communist worlds.

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1. DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS, ROMANIA'S MILITANT POLICIES OF INDEPENDENCE OF BOTH THE COMMUNIST AND NON-COMMUNIST WORLDS HAVE BEEN ACCENTUATED BY THE REGIME'S NATIONALISTIC COMMUNIST LEADERS. UNDER THE "SECOND GENERATION" COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP OF NICOLAE CEAUSESCU, THE REGIME HAS REPEATEDLY SHOWN ITS DETERMINATION TO IGNORE COMMUNIST SOLIDARITY IN PURSUIT OF ITS NATIONAL OBJECTIVES. BUCHAREST'S INSISTENCE UPON FREEDOM OF ACTION IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND EQUALITY OF COMMUNIST PARTIES IN FACT AS WELL AS IN THEORY HAS FREQUENTLY CLASHED WITH THE POLICY LINE ADOPTED BY MOSCOW AND ITS ALLIES.

2. THE ROMANIANS HAVE SOUGHT EXPOSURE TO THE WEST IN SEARCH OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND TECHNOLOGICAL BENEFITS. BUCHAREST HAS RECOGNIZED WEST GERMANY, REMAINED NEUTRAL IN THE ARAB ISRAELI CRISIS,

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
PAGE TWO

AND HAS MAINTAINED A STEADY STREAM OF VISITORS TO THE WEST,  
PARTICULARLY TO THE US.

3. HAVING ACHIEVED ITS MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY GOALS, THE  
REGIME PROBABLY WILL AVOID FURTHER UNDERTAKINGS THAT WOULD RISK  
POSSIBLE RUSSIAN OVER<sup>E</sup>REACTION. HOWEVER, AS THE LIMITS OF PER-  
MISSIBLE DIVERGENCE ARE EXTENDED BY PRACTICE, THE RUMANIANS CAN  
BE EXPECTED TO DEFINE IN EVEN MORE INDEPENDENT TERMS THEIR  
RELATIONSHIP TO THE COMMUNIST AND NON-COMMUNIST WORLDS.

END OF MESSAGE

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S E C R E T